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Abstract
Road tolls are a well established way of dealing with problems of con-
gestion. Over recent years, the literature has expanded to take account of
how congestion charges might interact with imperfections in other mar-
kets. In this paper, we consider the case where congestion occurs within
a complex road network, with congestion on multiple links. To derive a
truly optimal toll, account must be taken of the entire network. As a case
study, we take a stylised version of the road network in Bergen, Norway.
1 Introduction
Transportation infrastructure plays a vital role in overcoming spatial separation.
Every day, millions of commuters around the world undertake their journey to
work, many of them by road. A combination of population growth, urbanisation
and increasing economic prosperity has led to significant congestion problems
in many parts of the world, and in particular in the urban areas. This negative
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externalities has implications for the efficiency of the economy, people’s well-
being and the environment. In the U.S., Schrank et al. (2012) estimated the
cost of congestion in 2012 to be $121 bn, some $818 per commuter.
Given the seriousness of the problem, policy makers have considered a num-
ber of solutions. One approach is to expand capacity by building new roads.
This approach may be undesirable due to, for instance, its high costs or the en-
vironmental impact. Another problem with this approach is that it may in fact
generate so-called induced demand (Small and Verhoef, 2007, p. 176). A po-
tentially attractive alternative to expanding supply is to manage demand with
the implementation of congestion pricing.
The basic theory of congestion pricing is well understood, see for instance
Rouwendal and Verhoef (2006); Lindsey and Verhoef (2001). When only one
congested link is considered, under some simplifying assumptions it is trivial
to derive the optimal congestion charge, and to show that this optimises social
welfare. However, several authors have highlighted the fact that the real-world
implementation of congestion pricing regimes can be more complicated due to,
for example, pollution externalities (Newbery, 1988), road accidents (Small and
Kazimi, 1995), public transport subsidies (Glaister and Lewis, 1978) or distor-
tions in other markets (Parry and Bento, 2001).
One other theme which has been examined is the effect of a congestion charge
on one link when there are other congested links on the network. If congestion
exists on several links on a network, then a set of optimal prices needs to be
set to reach a socially optimal solution. Simply pricing one link may result in
undesired outcomes. This topic has been studied by Verhoef (2002a); Choe and
Clarke (2000); Braid (1996); Verhoef et al. (1996); Liu and McDonald (1998),
among others. These studies show that the optimal price on a particular link,
given the existence of unpriced congestion on other links, should be set lower
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than the first-best optimal price (Choe and Clarke, 2000).
In this paper, we construct a complex, multi-link model based on the road
network of the city of Bergen, Norway. The model is used to illustrate how
road pricing could be used to manage traffic demand in a network which is
more complex than the sort usually considered in the literature. Of particular
interest will be the difference between a do-nothing scenario, a partially-tolled
situation and a full set of optimum tolls. The scenarios will be compared based
on their impact on traffic flows, congestion, social welfare and the environment.
2 Theory and models
A brief presentation of the theory of optimal road pricing will be given here. For
a review, see Rouwendal and Verhoef (2006). Assume that the number of trips
across a particular road link in a network, Fr, is a function of the generalised cost
of traversing the link, cr. The cost can be decomposed into two components.
Part of the cost is determined by the length of the link, dr. The other part of
the cost is caused by congestion. Congestion occurs when the flow of traffic, Fr,
exceeds the capacity of the road, ωr.
We restrict our attention here to the journey to work and a static congestion
problem. A commuter will make the commute to work if the reward for doing
so outweighs the cost. In this case, the reward is the wage rate, ψ. So for
a commuter, the journey is profitable if ψ > cr. However, for society, this
outcome is suboptimal, because the individual addition of one commuter to the
road increases the cost of travel for all other road users. Only if the excess of the
wage over the total marginal cost is positive should the commute take place i.e.
ψ > cr+Fr
∂cr
∂Fr
. In order to move to this socially optimal outcome, a congestion
charge equal to Fr
∂cr
∂Fr
should be imposed.
This result holds as long as the underlying assumptions hold. As mentioned
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in the introduction, the literature has explored how departures from the first-
best solution may occur. See for example McArthur et al. (2012) for a discussion
of some of these issues. In this paper, we turn our attention to the case where
there are other market imperfections in the system, namely unpriced congestion
on other routes. We will present a model which allows us to find a system-wide
optimal set of prices.
2.1 Trip distribution
To begin, we must specify how demand and congestion is determined. A number
of simplifying assumptions underpin the model. Such simplifying assumption
allow us to consider a complex network, which is the main focus of this paper.
A short-term model situation is considered. In this situation, the locations of
workers and firms is assumed to be fixed. Furthermore, workers and jobs are
assumed to be homogeneous, and wages are fixed and equal. To further simplify
matters, we assume that only one mode of transport is available. This may be
thought of as a short-term response, before travellers have had time to change
their mode of transport.
In spatial interaction modelling, there are four aspects which can be con-
sidered: 1) trip generation, 2) trip distribution, 3) mode choice and 4) route
choice. In this paper we consider only trip distribution and route choice. Trip
generation is assumed to be exogenous to the model, and only one mode of
transport is assumed to exist. We will return in the concluding remarks to the
possibility of relaxing these assumptions. We begin by considering the trip dis-
tribution problem. The trip distribution should have the property that longer
commutes are chosen less frequently than short commutes. One model which
fits this description is the doubly-constrained gravity model.
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fij = aibje
−βCij (1)
ai =
Oi∑
j bjDje
−βCij
(2)
bj =
Dj∑
i aiOie
−βCij
(3)
In this model, fij is the number of commuters travelling from origin i to
destination j, Oi is the number of trips originating from i, and Dj is the number
of trips terminating in destination j. The quantities a and b are balancing
factors, with a ensuring that the rows of the trip distribution matrix sum to
give O and while b ensures the columns sum to give D. The idea of a gravity
model for spatial interaction is inspired by Newtonian physics, however variants
of this model may also be derived from entropy maximisation (Wilson, 1967) or
from random utility theory (Anas, 1983). For example, the doubly-constrained
gravity model can be shown to be identical to the multinomial logit model
(Anas, 1983).
In the gravity model, a measure of spatial separation is included. While
it is common to include distance here, we choose to include a generalised cost
measure. This allows the costs accruing from distance, time and tolls to be
aggregated. McArthur et al. (2013) show how commuters may react differently
to costs related to time and monetary expenses, and provide guidance on how
such costs can be aggregated. If i and j are directly connected, the Cij is simply
the cost of travelling on that road. If they are not directly connected, then Cij
is the sum of the costs incurred on the roads connecting i and j.
When the matrix of generalised costs is fixed, the solution to the gravity
model is well known; see for example Sen and Smith (1995). However, in our
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model Cij is a function of fij . This considerably increases the complexity of
computing the trip distribution matrix.
2.2 Route choice
As has already been alluded to, the cost of commuting along a stretch of road, r,
can be split into three components: 1) a fixed cost per km, 2) any costs imposed
by congestion and 3) any road tolls levied. This can be expressed as:
cr = γdr + αTr + δrRr (4)
where γ is the cost per km, dr is the length of road r, α is the value of travel
time, Tr is the travel time, δr is the dummy variable representing if a toll can
be charged on road r and Rr is any toll which may apply. The cost of a journey
from origin i to destination j can be obtained by summing over all of the roads
which link i and j.
The time taken to travel on a given link must be defined. The travel time
is defined as a function of the length of the link, dr, the flow of traffic on the
road, Fr, and the capacity of the road, ωr i.e. Tr = f(dr, Fr, ωr). We would like
a smooth function which is twice differentiable, and which has the properties
that ∂Tr∂Fr > 0 and
∂2Tr
∂F 2r
> 0 . A simple speed-density relationship such as that
given by Noland (1997) fits this description. See Castillo and Benitez (1995) for
a history of the speed-density relationship and a discussion of functional form.
Tr = dr
[
T 0r + T
1
r
(
Fr
ωr
)ε]
(5)
All variables here are defined as before. The quantity T 0r represents the time
taken to travel 1 km in the absence of congestion. The values T 1r and ε control
how quickly journey times rise as the ratio of use to capacity changes. A value
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of 0.15 is used for T 1 and a value of 4 for ε in Noland (1997). We allow the
values of T 0r and T
1
r to vary by road, to account for differences in speed limits.
We set T 1r = 0.15T
0
r , which implies that congestion affects travelling time more
on roads with lower speed limits (Liu and McDonald, 1998). This results in the
travel time function given below.
Tr = drT
0
r
[
1 + 0.15
(
Fr
ωr
)4]
(6)
In Equation (6), dr, T
0
r and ωr are constants. The flows on road r, Fr are
calculated based on the flows calculated in Equations (1)-(3). When the traffic
flows are known, it is relatively straightforward to calculate the traffic on any
individual link in the road network, as shown in Equation (7).
Fr =
∑
i,j
λrijfij (7)
In this equation, λrij is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if commuters
travelling from i to j use road r, and 0 otherwise. To summarise, commuters
will choose the least costly path conditional on congestion. For any commuter
travelling from k to l, this may be expressed more formally as:
minλr
kl
∑
r
crλ
r
kl (8)
Subject to
1. Selected roads form a path from origin k to destination l
2. cr = γdr + αTr + δrRr For all r = 1, ...,m
3. Tr = drT
0
r
[
1 + 0.15
(
Fr
ωr
)4]
For all r = 1, ...,m
4. Fr =
∑
i,j λ
r
ijfij For all r = 1, ...,m
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5. fij = aibje
−βCij For all i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., n
6. Cij =
∑
r λ
r
ijcr For all i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., n
An important point to note is that Cij is the minimum generalised cost for all
other commuters who travel from origin i to destination j. It can be seen from
the optimisation problem that the optimal decision for a particular commuter
(λrkl) depends on the decisions of other commuters (λ
r
ij). This problem can
therefore be considered a game between commuters.
2.3 Welfare maximisation
The goal of the planner is assumed to be the maximisation of social welfare
by setting an optimal set of congestion prices. We choose to use the change in
consumer surplus as the basis of our welfare measure, as in Verhoef (2002b).
The maximisation problem to be solved by the planner is given in Equation (9).
maxRr≥0
∑
i,j
∫ fij
0
Dij(xij)dxij −
∑
r
(cr − δrRr)Fr (9)
In this equation, Dij(x) is the inverse demand function. The expression
therefore equates to subtracting the total cost from the total benefit. For a
discussion of Equation (9), see Verhoef (2002b)1.
3 The road network
The road network considered in this paper is based on the city of Bergen, Nor-
way, and its surrounding area. The geography of the west coast of Norway
provides an interesting case study. The presence of fjords and islands necessi-
tates the use of bridges and ferries, as well as involving significant deviations
1Although the second expression in the objective function looks different from Verhoef’s
model, it is only due to the difference in definition of cr. In this paper, cr includes the road
toll but in Verhoef’s model it does not.
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from the Euclidean distance. This creates bottlenecks in the network which
may result in congestion. The city of Bergen itself is the second largest in Nor-
way, and has a population of around 270 000. The city has suffered from traffic
problems for many years (Ieromonachou et al., 2006; Odeck and Br˚athen, 2002).
This has led to queuing in the city, as well as contributing to rather serious air
quality problems in the city (McArthur and Osland, 2013).
A total of 25 zones were defined in the Bergen area, based on post code
areas. Not all of these zones are directly connected to one another. This results
in journeys between certain pairs of zones passing though other zones on the way.
In total, there are 35 road links in the simplified network which we consider.
The zones vary in size, both with respect to geographical area and popu-
lation. The number of people living in each zone, and the number working in
each zone is available at the level of post code area. The zones range from the
densely populated central business district (CBD) of Bergen, to the suburbs and
to settlements in the periphery. This gives zones of a variety of different sizes,
and involves a wide range of travel distances. The spatial configuration of the
zones along with the connectivity between them is illustrated in Figure 1.
In the network, we distinguish between roads which are congested, and those
which are not. The majority of the roads in the network are uncongested, as the
capacity exceeds the demand by a considerable margin. It is the roads in the
city centre which experience congestion, and it is therefore these roads which
will be the focus of this paper.
It is worth noting that in this network, the roads are neither perfect sub-
stitutes nor perfect complements. Due to the complexity of the network, a
commuter travelling from a given origin to a given destination may have sev-
eral alternative routes. Whether a road is a substitute for or a complement to
another road, will depend on the start and end points of the commuters journey.
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Figure 1: A map of Bergen with the transportation network we consider. Se-
lected zone names are displayed. The inset map shows the centre of bergen,
along with the four roads which are assumed to be congested.
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4 Results
The aim here is to solve the model to determine the set of optimal congestion
charges for the road network in Bergen. Solving the model is not a trivial
problem, since and changes in travelling costs on even one link may potentially
change the entire trip distribution matrix. This change in traffic flows causes
changes in travel times, due to changes in congestion. This in turn causes
further changes in the trip distribution matrix. We can calculate the change in
consumer surplus for each commuter when moving from one trip distribution
matrix to another. The change in social welfare is defined as the sum of these
changes in consumer surplus plus the change in revenue generated by the change
in the congestion charge.
The first step in deriving the optimal price in the model is to construct de-
mand curves for each origin-destination pair in the network. For any given con-
gestion charge, this is achieved by systematically varying the price and recording
the demand. This process continues until a sufficient number of points to allow
the construction of a demand curve have been obtained.
Numerical integration methods are used to find the change in consumer
surplus on each link when moving from one congestion charge to another. Social
welfare is calculated by summing over all commuters and adding in the proceeds
of the charge.
The Newton-Raphson method was employed to find the optimal price. Two
initial prices were chosen, and the marginal social welfare was calculated at
these prices. Comparing these two values leads to a new estimated price. One
of the initial estimates is replaced with this new estimate, and the marginal
social welfare is estimated again. The process is repeated until convergence is
achieved.
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4.1 The optimal charge for a single link
As a starting point, we consider the more traditional case where a congestion
charge will be applied to only one of the roads in the network. We selected
the most congested road to have a charge applied, and calculate the change in
social welfare. It is useful to examine a plot of the social welfare function. To do
this, the marginal social welfare is calculated at different prices. For example,
for R = 10, a point either side of this is evaluated. For example R = 9.9 and
R = 10.1. The change in social welfare between R = 9.9 and R = 10.1 can then
be calculated. From this, it is straightforward to calculate the marginal social
welfare. It is assumed that the social welfare function is linear for sufficiently
small intervals. The cumulative social welfare at different prices is presented in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Cumulative social welfare.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the function is smooth and well-behaved,
indicating that it is appropriate to apply classical numerical techniques. From
the plot, it is apparent that the optimal price for this road is around 16 NOK
(around £1.77, e2.09 or $2.71). The Newton-Raphson method provides a more
accurate estimate of 16.04 NOK.
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4.2 A full set of optimum charges
We now turn our attention to the more complex and interesting problem of
finding four optimal congestion charges. An iterative algorithm is used to find
the set of optimal charges. To begin with, the charge on three of the congested
roads is set to zero. The optimal price for the first road is found as in Section 4.1.
Once this has been found, the price is fixed, and the optimum price is found
for the second road. This process is then repeated for all of the roads until the
prices converge. The prices converge rapidly, and are stable after the second
iteration. Four iterations were carried out to ensure that convergence had been
achieved. The four optimal prices obtained are around 10, 11, 17 and 18 NOK.
As expected, the prices are higher for the more congested roads. Note that
optimal charge when considering only one link is not the optimal charge when
the system is considered in its entirety.
It is not possible to plot the social welfare function as in Figure 2, since the
optimisation takes place in 4 dimensions. However, some insight can be gained
by taking a partial approach. In Figure 3, the social welfare function is plotted
for each the roads assuming that the others have their charge fixed at its optimal
level.
Figure 3 shows that for all roads, the social welfare functions are smooth and
well-behaved. It also shows that they all behave slightly differently. Each has
its own optimum charge, and the sensitivity of welfare to changes in the charge
also varies. Note that road 1 shows the greatest potential for improvements
in welfare. Road 3 shows some potential for welfare improvement, and is less
sensitive to charging a sub-optimal amount.
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Figure 3: Cumulative social welfare for four different roads.
4.3 A single price for all roads
We can also consider a case where due to political or technical constraints, it
is not possible to differentiate the charge between different roads. Given this
constraint, a new optimum charge must be found. The same procedure as that
used in Section 4.1 is applied, except that the price applies to all four congested
roads. When this is done, the optimum price is found to be just under 16 NOK.
4.4 Comparison of results
We have seen that moving from no charging, to partial charging to full charging
of congestion improves welfare. There are however other effects which we may
consider. The main way in which congestion charging improves social welfare is
by reducing the time spend travelling, and particularly the time spent queuing.
The aggregate travelling time per day is presented in Table 1. The time spent
queuing is also presented.
Table 1 shows that, as expected, an increase in the level of congestion charg-
ing decreases the aggregate time spend travelling. The time spent in queues is
reduced particularly dramatically, by some 36% where full charging is imple-
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Road 1 Road 2 Road 3 Road 4 Total Queuing
No charging 18 857 14 230 11 724 16 882 255 027 7 202
Partial charging 16 131 14 146 11 857 16 805 252 486 6 121
Full charging 16 091 12 884 9 989 15 484 246 987 4 591
Table 1: Aggregate travel time in hours per day, for the entire road network.
mented compared to a situation with no charging. Looking at the travelling
time on each of the congested roads under the different charging regimes reveals
an interesting pattern. Moving from the situation with no charging to the situ-
ation where road one has a charge implemented reduces the total time travelled
on road 1. This is as expected. The charge also has the effect of lowering the
demand for and congestion on roads 2 and 4. However, the demand for trav-
elling on road 3 increases, along with the congestion. Implementing charging
on all four roads leads to a reduction in travelling on all of these roads, with a
corresponding drop in congestion.
The point which is highlighted here is that the road charges can be used to
modify people’s route choice decisions. Hence, charging on only one road may
have the undesirable consequence of making people choose another road which
also suffers from congestion. This problem can be handled by charging on all
congested roads.
For policy makers, achieving a more efficient use of the road network may be
the main aim. Congestion charging may also be used as a means of financing new
roads (Ieromonachou et al., 2006). However, another aim which policy makers
may have in mind is improving urban air quality (Johansson, 1997). In our
modelling framework, we have assumed that there are no other externalities.
Here, we consider how atmospheric emissions would be affected by different
congestion charging schemes.
In order to do this, some assumptions must be made regarding how travelling
distances translate into emissions. We base our assumptions on Hagman et al.
(2011), who have carried out emissions calculations for cars in Bergen. All cars
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are assumed to run on petrol. Hagman et al. (2011) provide emissions factors
for driving in a queue, in the city and on a country road. Our road network
is therefore split into countryside and urban areas. Distances spent in a queue
are also calculated. For mono-nitrogen oxides, NOx, we assume an emission
of 0.088 g/km, 0.067 g/km and 0.034 g/km for queuing, city and countryside
driving respectively. For particulate matter, PM, we assume 0.0009 g/km ,
0.0006 g/km and 0.0006 g/km. For carbon dioxide, CO2, we assume 322 g/km,
187 g/km and 133 g/km.
As well as calculating the quantity of emissions, we also consider a valuation
of these emissions. Magnussen et al. (2010) provide estimated unit prices of
the pollutants we consider for Bergen, and for the countryside. For emissions
in urban areas, we assume a costs for NOx, PM and CO2 of 200 NOK/kg,
2,900 NOK/kg and 0.2 NOK/kg. For non-urban areas we assume 50, 0 and 0.2
NOK/kg. The estimated environmental costs are presented in Table 2.
Roads 1-4 All roads Total
No charges 47 104 3 093 944 3 141 048
Partial charging 45 422 3 104 130 3 149 551
Full charging 5 401 3 130 845 3 136 246
Table 2: Estimated environmental cost per day under different charging regimes.
Value are in 2008 NOK. 10 NOK is around £1.11, e1.30 or $ 1.69
As expected, the application of a congestion charge to a road has the effect
of lowering the emissions from that particular road. Since this reduction in
congestion comes in part from making some road users choose alternative routes,
it is perhaps unsurprising that the emissions from traffic on the other roads
increases. However, the direction of the net effect may be somewhat surprising.
When partial charging is introduced, the overall level of emissions increases.
This is due to some people diverting from the charged road onto other congested
routes, and on to longer but less expensive routes. Drivers queuing on the other
congested routes have a higher level of emissions per km.
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The overall level of emissions drops when moving to a scenario with full
charging. The fall in emissions on the congested routes is more than enough
to offset the rise in the non-congested roads. The reduction in traffic on the
charged-roads has the effect of reducing the time spent in queues, which is
the least efficient form of driving. With regard to the environment then, the
situation with full optimal charging is the best, followed by no charging, with
partial charging giving the worst outcome. To arrive at optimal charges which
take into account congestion and environmental impacts, any environmental
externalities should be incorporated into the social welfare function, and all
roads in the network should be subject to a charge.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered the case of the optimal congestion charge for
a road which is part of a network, where other roads in the network may also
be congested. To do this, a static congestion problem was set, and a short-run
situation considered. Within this framework, three congestion charging regimes
were considered: a do-nothing scenario where no roads are charged, a situation
where one congested road has a charge levied and one where all congested roads
are charged.
The results of the model confirmed existing findings in the literature showing
that in order to maximise social welfare, the transportation network in its en-
tirety must be considered. Charging on only the most congested road can have
the undesired effect of pushing people on to other congested roads. A socially
optimal outcome can be achieved by deriving and implementing a set of optimal
prices.
Although in our model we considered a situation where congestion was the
only externalities, we also estimated the likely emissions associated with the
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traffic in our model, and estimated the cost of these emissions. We showed
the expected result that emissions on the roads subject to a charge fell. More
surprising perhaps is that we showed an increase in the system-wide emissions
for a situation with partial charging. This was due to people substituting the
charged-road with other congested roads and with longer but uncongested roads.
The model highlights the complexity which can arise when considering real-
world networks. While a road pricing regime may seem optimal when consider-
ing only one link, or only one set of links, the wider consequences may lead to
undesirable outcomes. This is a particularly important point in the Norwegian
case. Many of Norway’s public services are provided by its 429 municipalities.
This is quite a fine subdivision given that Norway has only around five million
inhabitants. Having so many municipalities may hinder cooperation on road
pricing, making it difficult to take a system-wide approach to the issue. It
would be better if municipalities were defined according to labour-market areas.
An important point to note is that we have considered a short-run situation.
In this short-run, we have assumed that the location of firms and workers re-
mains unchanged. In addition, we have assumed that motorists do not change
their mode of transport. Future research should look at the relaxation of these
assumptions, in the context of a complex network. It may be the case that the
short- and long-run optimal prices are different. In such a case, understanding
the dynamic aspect of the adjustment process is important. It is also important
that policy makers understand the long-term consequences of their actions.
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6 Notation
n Number of nodes in the network
m Number of links in the network
Fr Flow on road r
cr Generalised cost of traversing a particular link in a network
dr Length of a particular link
ωr Capacity of a particular link
ψ The wage rate
fij Number of commuters travelling from origin i to destination j
Oi Number of trips originating from node i
Dj Number of trips terminating in node destination j
a , b Balancing factors in gravity model
Cij Generalised travel cost from origin i to destination j
γ Cost per km
α Value of travel time
Tr Travel time on road r
δr Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a toll can be charged on link r, and 0 otherwise
Rr Toll on road r
T 0r The time taken to travel 1 km in the absence of congestion
T 1r , ε Congestion sensitivity of travel time
λrij Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if commuters travelling
from i to j use road r, and 0 otherwise
Dij(x) Inverse demand function for commuting from origin i to destination j
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